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Trading and Voting
David K. Musto and Bilge Yılmaz
University of Pennsylvania
Complete financial markets transform the political choice between
candidates with different redistribution policies. If redistribution pol-
icies do not affect aggregate wealth, then financial trade implies that
wealth considerations have no effect on voting and so do not affect
who wins. However, an election in which one candidate would redis-
tribute results in redistribution, and redistribution is the same whether
or not he wins. Furthermore, he proposes, and if elected carries out,
more redistribution than he prefers. If redistribution policies do affect
aggregate wealth, then everybody expects more wealth if the candidate
with the higher aggregate-wealth policy wins.
Elections assign the right to design tax policies, so to consumers they
represent uncertainty over future wealth. An election pitting a candidate
who proposes to redistribute wealth against another who does not in-
dicates one future state of the world in which the wealthy lose wealth
to the poor and another future state in which they do not. One impli-
cation of this uncertainty pertains to the election’s outcome: other
things equal, a voter chooses the candidate delivering him more wealth,
so the interaction of the tax policies with the wealth distribution decides
who wins. The literature has explored this implication extensively (see,
e.g., Myerson 1993; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Lizzeri and Persico
2000), including multiperiod models focusing on accumulating debt
(see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1990; Lizzeri 1999).
We are concerned here with a different implication, which can have
We thank Domenico Cuoco, Simon Gervais, Bob Inman, Antonio Merlo, Nicola Persico,
Tom Rietz, Nick Souleles, participants in the University of Pennsylvania’s Political Economy
seminar, two anonymous referees, and Fernando Alvarez, the editor, for helpful advice
and comments.
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strong implications for the first: consumers would respond to the wealth
uncertainty, as they do to other financial risks, in their demand for
financial instruments. If consumers can share the wealth risk by trading
election-contingent securities (e.g., paying one if the redistributionist
wins, zero if he loses) in a frictionless market, the outcome of the po-
litical process is quite different on all the important dimensions. The
probability that the redistributionist wins is different, the amount of
redistribution is different, and the timing of the redistribution is dif-
ferent too.
The intuition for this result is that the potential for redistribution
creates offsetting risks. The dollars that the wealthy lose to redistribution
match the dollars the poor gain, so the enthusiasm of the wealthy for
buying insurance against the redistributionist’s winning resembles the
enthusiasm of the poor for selling it. If voters can share this risk with
the state-contingent security, the equilibrium is full insurance; all con-
sumers equalize wealth across the two states. This delivers both the result
that wealth redistribution occurs before the election, rather than during
or after, and also the result that wealth considerations do not determine
who wins the election. With wealth the same whether or not the redis-
tributionist wins, voters refer to their nonwealth preferences when mak-
ing their choices. In other words, an externality of frictionless financial
risk sharing is that ideological, and not pocketbook, concerns decide
who governs.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section I covers
the relevant background. Section II presents the model, Section III
solves and interprets the model, and Section IV summarizes and presents
a conclusion.
I. Background
Consumers can vote themselves other people’s wealth. A candidate can
communicate that he would redistribute if elected, and a majority of
votes makes it happen. This would seem to have serious implications
for the distribution of wealth and the incentive to accumulate wealth
in the first place. When wealth is concentrated in a few voters, a can-
didate who favors redistribution would intuitively have an easy win over
a candidate who does not, and wealth would accordingly even out.
Consider a two-candidate race. Two candidates communicate how they
would govern, including how they would redistribute; then the vote
occurs and then the governing, including the redistribution. When the
candidates’ governing policies are endogenous, that is, they commu-
nicate whatever policies they want to communicate, not just the policies
that match their principles, the race becomes strategically interesting.
If candidates just care about winning and not redistribution per se, they
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will espouse redistribution anyway to buy votes (see, e.g., Myerson 1993).
Similarly, political parties with ideological motives are nonetheless mo-
tivated to buy votes with transfers (Dixit and Londregan 1996). Through-
out the extensive literature on this subject (see Drazen [2000] for a
review), candidates’ redistribution policies are viewed as key to electoral
outcomes, being the major—or only—determinant of voters’ preference
orderings, and the candidates’ policy choices are analyzed from this
perspective.
Now consider the race from the consumers’ point of view. The can-
didates partition the future into two possible states, one for each out-
come, and each consumer expects more wealth in one state than in the
other. So the election creates uncertainty over future wealth, and there
is an extensive literature on that subject, too. The standard analysis is
that consumers have strictly concave utility for wealth, so they are all
risk-averse at any wealth level; thus they would prefer to hedge uncer-
tainty over future wealth by trading financial securities. The uncertainty
caused by a potential redistribution is well suited to such trade, for two
reasons. First, if wealth is simply redistributed, rather than created or
destroyed, then net redistribution is zero in each state. This suggests
that the demand for securities that hedge against a candidate’s winning
matches the supply. Second, the contingency that consumers want to
hedge is easily verifiable and therefore contractible.
In a complete and perfect capital market, consumers enjoy frictionless
and unlimited access to a security paying one if a candidate wins and
zero if he loses. In actuality, consumers enjoy at least some access. Se-
curities contingent on the major U.S. elections trade on the Iowa Elec-
tronic Market, where there are no commissions but low position limits.1
Securities sensitive to, but not defined by, the major U.S. elections trade
without explicit position limits on the major exchanges. Examples in-
clude municipal bonds.2 Since financial market access is intuitively weak
for one side of this market, poor people,3 the result we find for complete
and perfect markets can be viewed as cautionary, a prediction of the
economy with easier access. And since some consumers might wish to
manipulate such a market should it exist, our results best represent an
economy in which manipulation is uneconomical or is outlawed.4
In summary, the existing literature on elections has not allowed for
1 Traders can spend up to $500 (see, e.g., Feder 2002).
2 See “Presidential Race Induces Creation of Index Strategies” (2000) for more examples.
3 One could, however, view municipal bonds as sales to rich people made on their behalf.
4 One source of manipulation is insider trading. Political insiders could not only buy
or sell on their information but also manipulate the market with strategic (potentially
false) announcements. The goal could be either to make money or to influence voters
through the market price. Another source is wealthy consumers; if campaign contributions
have sufficient impact on candidates’ chances (and thereby the market price), the rich
could find them more economical than insurance.
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consumers’ adaptive response to the uncertainty over wealth that po-
tential redistribution represents, and the response indicated by the lit-
erature on financial securities is to hedge by trading. To see that this
response is potentially crucial, consider a situation in which consumers
trade away all the risk, which is clearly possible since aggregate risk is
zero. How would they vote? In anticipation of that, how would they
trade in the first place? And what does this imply for the redistribution
of wealth? The next two sections answer these questions with a simple
but general model.
II. Model
A. The Setup
There are two dates, time 0 and time 1. There are two candidates, L
and R, who announce at time 0 what they would do if elected at time
1. There are N consumers who can trade at time 0 and can vote and
consume at time 1. What the consumers can trade is contracts that pay
one if L wins and zero otherwise. They can buy or sell any amount of
this contract. A candidate can propose a redistributive wealth tax that
occurs immediately upon election. The tax applies to postcontract
wealth: a consumer first pays or gets what his contract position dictates,
and then his resulting wealth is redistributed.
Candidate R communicates that he would govern with ideology R and
impose no tax, and L communicates that he would govern with ideology
L and impose a redistributive tax of t (the method of communication
is not modeled here; we take as given that voters learn that the can-
didates would enact these policies). The time t wealth of consumer c is
and the utility of consumer c over time 1 (postelection, postcontract,tw ,c
and postdistribution) wealth and ideology (i.e., the ideology of theI
winner) is
1u (w ) v (I),c c c
where and for all c.′ ′′u 1 0, u ! 0, v (R)( v (L)c c c c
The redistributive wealth tax collects t of each consumer’s wealth and
distributes of the receipts to each consumer. To allow a potential1/N
effect of the tax on real activity, we let represent a potentially nonzero,dc
pretax value change for consumer c. So if L wins, the wealth of consumer
c changes by and the total wealth in the economy changes by the sumdc
of across c. We denote the total wealth in the economy if L wins anddc
if R wins as and respectively, and we let stand for per capitaL R ¯W W , w
wealth if L wins, that is, So the net redistribution to a con-L ¯W /Np w.
sumer with postcontract wealth w (which includes d) is ¯t(w w).
All consumers know the total wealth in the economy for both out-
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Fig. 1
comes. Therefore, each consumer can calculate his wealth under both
policies in period 1. Let andL L L R R Rw p (w , … , w ) w p (w , … , w )1 N 1 N
stand for period 1 wealth distribution. Similarly, denotesvp (v , … , v )1 N
the ideological preferences. At period 0, there is uncertainty about the
collection of all consumers’ ideology, v, wealth distribution (and there-
fore period 1 wealth distribution, ), and identity of consumers.L R(w , w )
This uncertainty is represented by a finite set S of states. Consumers
share a common prior about the true state of the world. Let r stand
for this probability measure on S. Each consumer has private infor-
mation in the sense that he knows at least his own ideological preference
and wealth. This private information is described by a par-SH : S r 2 ,c
titional information function. (Given the true state, consumer cs  S,
knows that the true state could be any element of ) In addition,H (s).c
there is residual uncertainty over events that will affect the election
outcome such as turnout, revelations about candidates’ private lives,
wars, recounts, and so on. Let be the joint probability distri-f(d, p, s)
bution describing this residual uncertainty after trading at price p, where
if candidate L wins and zero otherwise. Therefore, we can ruledp 1
out any trivial setting: At period 0, no consumer can be sure about the
outcome of the election independent of the amount of information he
has, that is, for all p and s. For further use, let p0 ! f(dp 1Fp, s) ! 1
stand for the value of this conditional probability when Finally,L Rw p w .
we assume that no consumer is negligible in determining the election
outcome: for all and for all and p, we havec  {1, … , N } s  S
f(dp 1FH (s), H (s), p)( f(dp 1FH (s), p),c c c
where
H (s)P {H (s), … , H (s), H (s), … , H (s)}.c 1 c1 c1 N
We can summarize the model with the following chronology, illus-
trated in figure 1.
1. Before date 0, consumers learn that L will impose ideology L and
tax t if elected, and R will impose ideology R.
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2. At date 0, consumers trade election-contingent securities; consumer
c buys contracts. After trading, there is residual uncertainty overxc
the election’s outcome.
3. At date 1, (a) consumers vote in the election, and the residual
uncertainty is resolved. (b) If L won, consumer c receives fromxc
his contracts and from the effect of the tax on real activity. (c)dc
The winner’s ideology is implemented, and if L won, then consumer
c pays a tax of t times his current wealth and receives t times the
average wealth w¯.
B. Discussion of Modeling Choices
It would be simpler to solve a model with atomistic, and therefore price-
taking, consumers.5 But while that approximation is acceptable in some
settings, it is inappropriate here because it ruins the incentive to vote.
That is, if a consumer’s trading does not affect prices, then his voting
should not affect the election. So we allow traders to move the market,
in that the market price aggregates traders’ information, though we do
not explicitly model the trading mechanism. We solve for the equilib-
rium by first positing the existence of a price at which there is no∗p
further trade and then solving for There could in practice be an∗p .
incentive for candidates or their supporters to manipulate the market
price since it can be taken as a de facto poll result (see, e.g., “Iowa
Business School’s Presidential Futures Market Still Too Close to Call,”
CNN Transcript 00110602V62, November 6, 2000). We are abstracting
from that incentive in our analysis.
One potential concern with trading before voting is that the trading
could reveal exactly who wins, so that the price goes to zero or one. To
keep the focus on nontrivial trading outcomes, we assume that there is
sufficient uncertainty over events intervening between trading and vot-
ing that the election’s outcome cannot be predicted exactly with infor-
mation known at trading time. So we do not endogenize the timing of
the trading relative to the arrival of election-relevant news, but it is
intuitive that consumers would want to take their position in election-
contingent securities before a given source of uncertainty taps out, not
after.
Our analysis equates the state {L wins} to the state {L’s policies are
enacted}. These states may not in practice be truly equivalent as a result
of, for example, the competing agendas of other branches of govern-
ment. In such cases the security is more accurately viewed as policy-
5 In an earlier version, we show that our main results hold under the assumption of a
continuum of consumers/voters.
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contingent rather than election-contingent. That is, it pays one if and
only if L’s policies are enacted.
We model utility over wealth as separable from utility over ideology.
This is the same approach taken by Dixit and Londregan (1996). It is
not hard to think of campaign positions that relate to both wealth and
ideology, such as federal funding of abortions or even redistribution
itself. We are implicitly analyzing these positions as packages, combining
wealth effects that affect consumers through u and therefore interact
with other wealth effects such as security payoffs and ideological effects
that are felt through v.
Finally, our representation of the effect of taxes on real activity,
through is reduced form and is not intended to be a rigorous analysisd ,c
of that problem, which is analyzed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Meltzer
and Richard 1981). The flat wealth tax is an approximation of federal
taxes whose incidence generally increases with personal wealth. It is
functionally equivalent to the linear income tax in Meltzer and Richard
(1981), where voters start with no wealth.
III. Analysis
Let be the equilibrium price of a contract. We first take it as given∗p
and then solve for it. If consumer c buys contracts, then he paysxc
at time 0 and then gets pretax in the state {L wins} and nothing∗x p xc c
in the state {R wins}. The wealth he consumes is therefore
0 ∗ 0 ∗¯w  x p  x  d  t[w (w  x p  x  d )]pc c c c c c c c
∗ 0¯tw (1 t)[(1 p )x  w  d ]c c c
in {L wins} and in {R wins}. To calculate c’s optimal contract0 ∗w  x pc c
position, we need the probability he puts to the outcome {L wins}, which
for the moment we call With this notation, c’s problem is to chooseP .c
the that maximizesxc
∗ 0¯P [u (tw (1 t)[(1 p )x  w  d ]) v (L)]c c c c c c
0 ∗ (1 P )[u (w  x p ) v (R)].c c c c c
With and representing c’s terminal wealth in {L wins} and {R wins},L Rw wc c
respectively, the first-order condition can be written as
′ L ∗ ′ R ∗P u (w )(1 t)(1 p )p (1 P )u (w )p . (1)c c c c c c
If and this can be rewritten as∗P ( 0 p ( 1,c
′ L ∗u (w ) (1 P )pc c cp . (2)′ R ∗u (w ) P (1 t)(1 p )c c c
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A. Pure Redistribution
We first focus on the pure redistribution case, that is,  d p 0.cc
Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium, all consumers equalize
wealth across the possible electoral outcomes, and the outcome is de-
termined solely by ideology rather than by the distribution of wealth.
Proof. The proof of uniqueness is presented in the Appendix. Here,
we construct an informationally efficient rational expectations equilib-
rium (REE). In an informationally efficient REE, the equilibrium price
is a sufficient statistic for all private information. Therefore, is thePc
same for all c. Assume for the moment that and ∗0 ! P ! 1 0 ! p ! 1.c
The right-hand side of (2) is the same for all c, so all consumers equalize
to the same number. This number must be one because′ L ′ Ru (w )/u (w )c c c c
if it were greater than one, then everybody would have more wealth in
{R wins} than in {L wins}, and this is not possible because aggregate
wealth is the same in both states. Analogously, the number cannot be
less than one. So it is one, implying for all c.L Rw p wc c
With wealth equalized across outcomes, a consumer prefers the out-
come {L wins} to {R wins} if and only if So the probabilityv (L) 1 v (R).c c
of {L wins} is p, which by assumption is strictly between zero and one.
This also implies that because if everyone would be∗ ∗0 ! p ! 1 p p 1,
better off selling more contracts, and if everyone would be better∗p p 0,
off buying more. Market clearance follows immediately from lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
The equilibrium contract price is easily inferred.
Lemma 1. The price per contract is∗p (p pt)/(1 pt).
Proof. Set the right-hand side of (2) equal to one and solve for ∗p .
Q.E.D.
Note that is always less than p for We can also solve for the∗p t 1 0.
number of contracts purchased.
Lemma 2. Consumer c buys
1 pt 0 ¯x p [t(w  w) (1 t)d ]c c c( )1 t
contracts.
Proof. Set plug in the equilibrium value of and solve forL R ∗w p w , p ,
Q.E.D.x .c
This can also be written as
p 0 ¯x p [t(w  w) (1 t)d ],c c c( )∗p
which leads to our next major result.
Proposition 2. When consumers trade before voting, the wealth re-
distribution occurs before the election, is unrelated to the outcome,
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and is the product of the probability that the redistributionist wins when
votes depend only on ideology and the redistribution that would have
occurred without trading if the redistributionist won.
Proof. In both states, wealth equals which is0 ∗w  x p ,c c
p0 0 ∗¯w  [t(w  w) (1 t)d ]p ,c c c( )∗p
or So the wealth redistribution is0 0¯w  p[t(w w ) (1 t)d ].c c c
regardless of who wins, and this is p times the0¯p[t(w w ) (1 t)d ]c c
redistribution that would have occurred in {L wins} without trading.
Q.E.D.
This is a big departure from the standard economic analysis of elec-
tions. When consumers can trade before voting, the wealth effect of a
candidate’s redistribution plan no longer affects his chances of winning,
but it does affect the resulting redistribution whether or not he wins.
The magnitude of the effect depends on his chances of winning, but
his chances of winning depend solely on his ideological appeal.6 The
wealth effect on the median wealth voter is not relevant. Consumers
can trade wealth but not ideology across states, and this is what happens.
Because it affects the state probabilities, the trade in election-contin-
gent securities is not simply Pareto-improving risk sharing. Poor people
could view it as a coordination problem. The redistributionist might
have been an almost sure thing if wealth distribution influenced voting,
but not with wealth equalized, so the net expected redistribution to
consumer c goes from close to to0 0¯ ¯t(w w ) (1 t)d p[t(w w )c c c
This is an adverse development if (and is small),0 ¯(1 t)d ]. w ! w dc c c
but the consumer is better off trading than not even though he would
be best off if nobody traded. The poor would like to avoid this effect
of trading by coordinating if they could find an incentive-compatible
mechanism that implements their preferred no-trade outcome distri-
bution. A constitutional amendment or referendum banning election-
contingent trade may serve this purpose (though this vote would itself
be susceptible to hedging).
1. Strategic Policy Choices
So far we have not specified a set of preferences for the candidates, but
rather taken their policy choices as given and analyzed the consumers’
reaction. However, if candidates care about the enacted policies (both
6 Our results do not depend on a perfect hedge. If we instead assume that the contract
pays off in the wrong state (i.e., R wins) with probability e, we can show numerically with
specific utility and distributional assumptions that the resulting equilibrium converges to
the one solved here as (results available on request).e r 0
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ideological and redistributive), they will strategize over their policy
choices. Maximizing expected utility, each candidate must consider a
policy’s electability as well as its desirability. Let denote theU (t, I, d)L
preference of candidate L.7 We assume that there exists a redistribution
such that for all and for all I and d.′ ′ˆ ˆ ˆt U (t , I, d) 1 U (t , I, d) t ( tL L L L L
The preference of candidate R is analogous, and to simplify, we assume
that candidate R prefers no redistribution, that is, Prior to trad-tˆ p 0.R
ing, each candidate announces a tax rate and an ideological policy.8 We
further assume that candidates can commit to policies and negative
redistribution is not possible, that is, At the time candidates an-t ≥ 0.
nounce policies, they know that the election will depend solely on v
because of backward induction, and their utilities can increase with their
odds of winning because of either the effect on net distribution (as
argued in the previous proposition), the direct utility from winning, or
the chances of implementing their ideologies. Therefore, each may
prefer to announce more moderate ideological policies in order to
increase the probability of winning and maximize expected utility. On
the other hand, the choice of tax rate will have no effect on the outcome
of the election. However, we have shown that the tax rate will affect the
wealth distribution independently of who wins, so to cause the redis-
tribution that tax rate causes in the absence of trading, candidate LtˆL
commits to a tax rate higher than 9tˆ .L
Proposition 3. When candidates choose their policies strategically,
candidate L chooses a tax rate that causes more gross redistribution
than the amount of net redistribution that L prefers or expects.
The proof follows immediately from the previous proposition and the
fact that p ! 1.
B. Economic Efficiency
The propositions to this point all assume that that is, no ag- d p 0,cc
gregate real effect of the tax. We can allow for an aggregate real effect
by relaxing this assumption. In this case we can no longer peg the right-
hand side of (2) at a given number, but we can establish whether it is
greater or less than one, which allows us to relate the aggregate effect
to wealth preferences.
Proposition 4. When consumers trade before voting and aggregate
7 Note that candidate L’s utility is not a function of ; thus he is indifferent overdc
individual wealth effects and cares only about the aggregate redistribution. This simplifies
our next proposition.
8 Implicitly, we assume that there exists a set of possible policies that contains R and L.
9 With no hedging possibilities, Roemer (1998) shows that a leftist candidate proposes
a lower redistribution (possibly zero) when two candidates compete in a two-dimensional
policy space.
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wealth depends on who wins, all consumers expect after trading to have
more wealth if the higher-wealth candidate wins.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let {R wins} be the higher-wealth state.
In an informationally efficient REE, the right-hand side is the same
value for all consumers. This value must be greater than one because
if it were less than or equal to one, then all consumers would have more
wealth (or the same, respectively) in {L wins} than they do in {R wins},
both of which are not possible. With the right-hand side greater than
one, all consumers have more wealth in {R wins}. Q.E.D.
So the wealth effect is strictly in the direction of the higher-wealth
candidate. The resulting effect on the probability that this candidate
wins depends on the relative strength of ideological preferences. In the
intuitive case in which aggregate wealth decreases as t increases, L de-
creases his probability of winning (with ideologies held constant) as he
increases t. In this case, L chooses a higher tax rate in economies in
which leftist ideology is widely popular: higher taxes destroy more
wealth, so all consumers have less wealth; but L can afford this loss of
voters’ wealth as long as they have sufficiently high relative tov (L)c
On the other hand, if there is no ideological difference betweenv (R).c
the candidates, so that for all c, we get the stronger resultv (R)p v (L)c c
that consumers trade to the point at which they all want the higher-
wealth candidate to win.
Corollary 1. When consumers trade before voting and aggregate
wealth depends on who wins but utility from ideology does not, then
after trading, all consumers prefer that the higher-wealth candidate win.
The frictionless trading opportunity biases the election toward the
outcome with greater real activity.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
An election creates wealth risk, and a securities market reallocates wealth
risk. The wealth risk created by an election with redistribution at stake
is well suited for trade in that demand naturally equals supply. If one
candidate would redistribute (but not create or destroy) wealth with a
linear tax and this trade is frictionlessly available, the result is a trans-
formed election, with wealth considerations separated completely from
voting decisions and redistribution separated completely from the elec-
tion’s outcome. These results constitute a baseline case for arguments
that redistribution buys votes or that the amount of redistribution de-
pends on the election’s outcome. For those arguments to go through,
there must be some departure from our assumptions, such as transac-
tions costs, incomplete markets, or effects of taxation on aggregate
wealth. When we introduce an effect on aggregate wealth, we find that
all consumers, after trade, expect more wealth in the higher-wealth state.
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Today’s markets depart from the idealized trade in our analysis with
their positive transactions costs, imperfect hedges, and position limits.
So one perspective on our results is that they warn of consequences
from eliminating these frictions. Trade in Arrow-Debreu state-contin-
gent securities might seem obviously Pareto-improving, but when state
probabilities are endogenous, this is no longer clear. Elections are just
one, well-defined, example of this endogeneity; the point applies more
generally.
Another perspective on the results is that consumers’ financial ex-
posures to an election have qualitatively different implications for the
outcome and net effect of the election than their other exposures do.
Financial exposure can be traded across states, and risk aversion en-
courages this trade. So elections determine wealth redistribution dif-
ferently from the way they determine other policies at stake, raising the
question as to whether they are equally efficient at resolving distribu-
tional and ideological disputes.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we shall first define the equilibrium concept and recall the
definition of common knowledge. Second, we shall prove the uniqueness of
equilibrium.
Definition A1. Price is an equilibrium if the following∗p (H (s), … , H (s))1 N
conditions hold:
1. At each consumer votes to maximize his expected utility given histp 1,
postelection wealth, and ideology,1w , v (7).c c
2. At each consumer chooses his demand (p, to maximize ex-tp 0, x H (s))c c
pected utility assuming that the probability is given by ∗P f(dp 1Fpp p ,c
where is the true joint probability dis-∗H (s)), f(dp 1, p , H (s), … , H (s))c 1 N
tribution given and optimal voting at∗p (H (s), … , H (s)) tp 1.1 N
3. Given consumers’ demands, is market clearing for all∗p (H (s), … , H (s))1 N
realizations of consumers’ private information.
Definition A2. An event is self-evident between consumers c and if′FP S c
for all we have and . An event is common knowledges F H (s) H (s)P F EP S′c c
between consumers c and in state s if there is a self-evident event F for which′c
s FP E.
Lemma A1. There exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. We prove our claim in two steps. First, we show that the full information
economy has a unique equilibrium. This result implies that there can be at most
one informationally efficient REE. Second, we show that there are no partially
revealing or nonrevealing REE.
In a full information economy, is the same for all consumers. Furthermore,Pc
is strictly between zero and one by the residual uncertainty assumption. There-Pc
fore, equation (2) must hold for every equilibrium of the full information econ-
omy. However, this implies the equilibrium characterized by proposition 1. This
concludes the first step.
Now we proceed with the second step that there are no partially revealing or
nonrevealing REE. Suppose not. Then there is an equilibrium price that is′p
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not informationally efficient. Equation (2) must hold for this equilibrium as
well given the residual uncertainty assumption. If each consumer has equalized
wealth across states, then for all c.L R ′ ′w p w , (1P )p/[P (1 t)(1 p )]p 1c c
This implies that for all c. However, cannot be′ ′ ′P p p/[(1 t)(1 p ) p ] Pc c
the same for all c given that at least one consumer has private information.
Therefore, the only possibility left is for at least′ ′(1P )p/[P (1 t)(1 p )]( 1c c
one consumer. Therefore, there exists at least one consumer, say c, who has not
equalized wealth across states. Without loss of generality, assume that this con-
sumer has more wealth if L wins. From the market clearance condition, there
must exist another consumer, say who has more wealth if R wins. Therefore,′c ,
′ L ′ Lu (w ) u (w )′ ′c c c c
! .′ R ′ Ru (w ) u (w )′ ′c c c c
Consequently, from equation (2), we must have that is,P 1 P , f(dp′c c
Market clearance also implies that this inequality is com-1FH (s)) 1 f(dp 1FH (s)).′c c
mon knowledge among these two consumers. (Equivalently, we say that event
Ep {s SFf(dp 1FH (s)) 1 f(dp 1FH (s))}′c c
is common knowledge.) In the rest of the proof we shall show that common
knowledge of such a disagreement cannot occur in equilibrium. Given that the
event is common knowledge, there must be anf(dp 1FH (s)) 1 f(dp 1FH (s))′c c
event that is a subset of E and is a union of members of the informationF s
partitions of both consumers, that is, Given thatw [H (s)∪H (s)]p FP E.′sF c c
is common knowledge for all this inequalityf(dp 1FH (s)) 1 f(dp 1FH (s)) s F,′c c
must hold for all Therefore, we havef(dp 1FH (s)) 1 f(dp 1FH (s)) s F.′c c
r(s)f(dp 1FH (s)) 1 r(s)f(dp 1FH (s)).′ c c
sF sF
But since F is a union of members of each consumer’s information partition,
both sides of this inequality are equal to However, this contradictsr(F )f(dp 1FF ).
the inequality above and concludes the second part of the proof. Therefore,
neither partially revealing nor nonrevealing equilibria can exist. Q.E.D.
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